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230 South 500 East #400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re: Worth L. and Annette c. Orton v. Collection Division of 
Utah State Tax Commission, Case No. 930320-CA 
Dear Ms. Noonan: 
Pursuant to Rule 24(j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure and in response to the submission of pertinent 
supplemental authorities by the Utah State Tax Commission, 
appellants hereby call to the court's attention several recently 
identified decisions. These cases pertain to pages 1 through 8 
of petitioners'/appellants' reply brief. 
The cases enclosed with this letter and considered 
supplemental authority are: 
1. Maverick Country Stores, Inc. v. industrial Comm. of 
Utah, 1993 WL355459 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) [not yet released for 
publication] (in which the court specifically recognizes that 
following submission of a motion for reconsideration a petitioner 
"no longer has a 'final agency action' from which to appeal."); 
2. Northwest Central Pipeline v. state Corp. Comm., 735 
P.2d 241 (Kan. 1987) (giving definition to the term final agency 
action when agency issues more than one Order); 
3. Lopez v. Career Services Review Bd., 834 P.2d 568, 572 
(recognizing necessity for appellate courts to have unambiguous 
final administrative orders from which to calculate 
jurisdictional time periods). 
Sincerely, 
STRONG & HANNI 
Dennis M. Astill 
AFT:mrs 
N.W. CENTRAL PIPELINE v. STATE CORP, COM'N Kan. 2 4 1 
Cite as 735 P.2d 241 (Kan. 1987) 
oner during his conditional release and 
what those conditions should be. 
The problem that I have in this case is 
that it is entirely possible that the evidence 
developed by the plaintiffs in their dis-
covery may show that the members of the 
Kansas Adult Authority did not follow its 
proscribed regulations and adopted a blan-
ket policy to release a prisoner on condi-
tional release in every case without any 
concern whatsoever for the safety of the 
public 
Before the nonliability of the members of 
the KAA in this case can be determined, it 
is my opinion that the trial court should 
have reviewed the rules, regulations, and 
guidelines established by the KAA and 
then considered the nature and extent of 
the decision-making process actually uti-
lized by the KAA in releasing Bradley R. 
Boan. 
Before paroling a prisoner, the Kansas 
Adult Authority is specifically required to 
"consider all pertinent information regard-
ing each inmate, including but not limited 
to the circumstances of the offense of the 
inmate; the presentence report; the previ-
ous social history and criminal record of 
the inmate; the conduct, employment, and 
attitude of the inmate in prison; and the 
reports of such physical and mental exami-
nations as have been made/' K.S.A. 1986 
Supp. 22-3717(g). The same considerations 
which govern the decision whether to pa-
role or discharge a prisoner also should 
govern the conditions to be attached to the 
release. K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 22-3718 re-
quires that an inmate eligible for condition-
al release shall be subject to such written 
rules and conditions as the authority may 
impose. The Kansas Adult Authority regu-
lations state that conditional releasees may 
be placed, "under mandatory in-state pa-
role supervision" for 90 to 120 days or 
longer and they may be subject to the same 
treatment and conditions as all other parol-
ees while on parole. K.A.R. 45-10-1. 
In my judgment, these rules and regula-
tions require the Kansas Adult Authority 
to consider the welfare of society when 
determining whether to impose conditions 
on releasees. In Hopkins v. State, 237 
Kan. 601, 702 P.2d 311 (1985), it is stated 
that discretion implies the exercise of dis-
criminating judgment within the bounds of 
reason. Whether the Kansas Adult Au-
thority breached a nondiscretionary duty 
by exercising its discretion in bad faith and 
in a reckless manner cannot be determined 
without a full and complete analysis of the 
factual circumstances, which have not been 
developed in this case. 
In my judgment, this case should be re-
versed and remanded to the trial court with 
directions to afford the parties an opportu-
nity to develop the facts, so that both the 
trial court and an appellate court can deter-
mine whether or not the Kansas Adult Au-
thority is liable in failing to carry out its 
obligation to impose conditions on a condi-
tional release in order to protect the public. 
HERD, J., joins 
dissenting opinion. 
the foregoing 
| KEY NUMBER SYSTEM> 
241 Kan. 165 
NORTHWEST CENTRAL PIPELINE 
CORPORATION, n/k/a Williams Natu-
ral Gas Company, Petitioner-Appellant, 
v. 
The STATE CORPORATION COMMIS-
SION of the State of Kansas, Michael 
Lennen, Chairman, Margalee Wright, 
Commissioner, Keith R. Henley, Com-
missioner, and their respective succes-
sors in office, as members of the State 
Corporation Commission, et al., Re-
spondents-Appellees. 
Nos. 59735, 59738, 60143 and 60187. 
Supreme Court of Kansas. 
March 27, 1987. 
Petitions were filed seeking judicial re-
view of actions of the Corporation Commis-
sion relative to an oil company's application 
to amend its basic proration order to permit 
2 4 2 Kan. 735 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
infill drilling. The Shawnee District Court, 
James P. Buchele and Fred S. Jackson, JJ., 
and the Gray District Court, Don C. Smith, 
J., dismissed the appeals on procedural 
grounds. Appeal was taken. The Su-
preme Court, McFarland, J., held that (1) 
petitions for judicial review which were 
filed before final action on rehearing were 
premature, even if the Corporation Com-
mission did not permit the introduction of 
additional evidence on rehearing; (2) the 
failure to permit additional evidence did not 
render the granting of a rehearing a nullity 
so as to make the underlying order final 
agency action; (3) a pipeline company was 
not required to seek a rehearing on the 
rehearing order so as to nullify the effect 
of the pipeline company's loss of the "race 
to the courthouse"; and (4) the pipeline 
company was not denied due process. 
Affirmed. 
Lockett, J., concurred in result 
1. Administrative Law and Procedure 
e=>704 
Mines and Minerals €=>92.61 
Corporation Commission's decision 
granting amendment of oil company's basic 
proration order to permit infill drilling in 
field was not final for purposes of judicial 
review after Commission granted rehear-
ing, even if Commission permitted introduc-
tion of additional evidence only on some 
issues. 
2. Administrative Law and Procedure 
<3=>704 
Mines and Minerals <s=*92.61 
Corporation Commission's failure to 
open door to additional evidence on all is-
sues, after rehearing was granted from 
order permitting infill drilling in field, did 
not render granting of rehearing a nullity 
for purposes of determining whether peti-
tions for review from original order were 
premature. 
3. Administrative Law and Procedure 
<3»704 
Mines and Minerals <3=*92.61 
Pipeline company's petition for judicial 
review, which was filed before Corporation 
Commission entered its order on rehearing 
of original order permitting amendment of 
oil company's basic proration order to per-
mit infill drilling in field, was premature 
for purposes of determining whether coun-
ty in which pipeline company filed petition 
for judicial review had jurisdiction over an-
other county in which royalty owners' asso-
ciation filed petition for judicial review on 
date of rehearing order. K.S.A. 55-606(a). 
4. Administrative Law and Procedure 
<fc*664 
Mines and Minerals <3=>92.61 
Pipeline company was not required to 
seek modification of rehearing order via 
additional motion for rehearing before Cor-
poration Commission, even if order on re-
hearing substantially modified original or-
der, and, therefore, pipeline company's fil-
ing of motion for additional rehearing did 
not defeat jurisdiction of county in which 
royalty owners' association filed its petition 
for judicial review after royalty owners' 
association won "race to courthouse." 
K.S.A. 55-606, 66-118b. 
5. Administrative Law and Procedure 
<3=>664 
Mines and Minerals <3=>92.61 
Pipeline company could not nullify ef-
fect of its loss of "race to courthouse" by 
simply filing additional motion for rehear-
ing after Corporation Commission entered 
rehearing order in proceeding in which oil 
company sought amendment of its basic 
proration order to permit infill drilling. 
K.S.A. 55-606, 66-118b. 
6. Administrative Law and Procedure 
<S=>481 
Mines and Minerals <s=>92.59 
Pipeline company had no constitutional 
or statutory right to rehearing of order in 
which Corporation Commission permitted 
infill drilling in proration order or, if re-
hearing was granted, to have reconsidera-
tion of all issues contained in underlying 
order on which rehearing was granted. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmends. 5, 14. 
7. Constitutional Law <S=»318(7) 
Each interested party in Corporation 
Commission order on application to amend 
N.W. CENTRAL PIPELINE v. STATE CORP. COMW Kan. 2 4 3 
a t e M 735 P.2d 241 (Kan. 1987) 
oil company's basic proration order to per-
mit infill drilling did not have due process 
right to judicial review in district court of 
its choice; rather, judicial review was to 
proceed in district court which first ac-
quired jurisdiction. KSA 65-606(a); U.S. 
GA. ConstAmends. 5, 14. 
Syllabus by the Court 
1. Where the Kansas Corporation 
Commission grants rehearing on an order 
concerning amendment of a basic proration 
order, a petition for judicial review filed 
prior to the filing of the order on rehearing 
is premature as no final Kansas Corpora-
tion Commission order has been entered. 
The fact that the Kansas Corporation Com-
mission order granting rehearing specified 
certain areas on which additional evidence 
would be permitted and supplemental oral 
arguments allowed does not render the bal-
ance of the order ripe for judicial review. 
2. Where the Kansas Corporation 
Commission grants rehearing on an order 
concerning proration, there is no statutory 
requirement that a party aggrieved by the 
order entered on rehearing seek rehearing 
on the rehearing order as a condition to 
seeking judicial review. 
8. Judicial review of a Kansas Corpo-
ration Commission order relative to pro-
ration is discussed and held to lie in the 
district court first acquiring jurisdiction in 
the matter. The filing of a motion for 
rehearing of the order on rehearing does 
not defeat the jurisdiction of the court first 
acquiring jurisdiction on a proper petition 
for judicial review in the matter. 
4. A party does not have a constitu-
tional or statutory right to have motions 
for rehearing granted by the Kansas Cor-
poration Commission in a proration matter 
or, if granted, to have reconsideration of all 
issues contained in the order on which re-
hearing was granted. Denial of due pro-
cess arguments relative to rehearings be-
fore the Kansas Corporation Commission 
are discussed and rejected. 
Mark H. Adams, II, of Adams & McCar> 
thy, of Wichita, argued the cause, and J.D. 
Steelman, Jr., Associate Gen. Counsel, of 
Northwest Central Pipeline Corp., of Tulsa, 
OkL, was with him on the briefs, for peti-
tioner-appellant. 
Kirby A. Vernon, Asst Gen. Counsel, 
argued the cause, and Brian J. Moline, Gen. 
Counsel, Kansas Corp. Com'n, was with 
him on the brief, for respondents-appellees. 
John C. Lovett, of Cities Service Oil and 
Gas Corp., of Tulsa, Oklahoma, and Stan-
ford J. Smith and Stanford J. Smith, Jr., of 
Robbin3, Tinker, Smith & Metzger, of 
Wichi+a, were on the briefs, for respondent-
appellee Cities Service Oil and Gas Corp. 
Steven D. Gough and Alan R. Pfaff, of 
Kahrs, Nelson, Fanning, Hite & Kellogg, 
of Wichita, were on the briefs, for respon-
dent-appellee Amoco Production Co. 
N.E. Maryan, Jr., of Mobil Oil Corp., of 
Denver, Colo., and Jerome E. Jones, and 
Patricia A. Gorham, of Hershberger, Pat-
terson, Jones & Roth, of Wichita, were on 
the briefs, for intervenor Mobil Oil Corp. 
Nefl 0 . Bowman, of Mesa Operating Ltd. 
Partnership, of Amarillo, Tex., J.A. Han-
nah, of Tenneco Oil Co., of Oklahoma City, 
OkL, and Richard C. Byrd, of Anderson, 
Byrd & Richeson, of Ottawa, were on the 
brief, for interveners Mesa Operating Ltd. 
Partnership and Tenneco Oil Co. 
McFARLAND, Justice: 
This consolidated case involves four ap-
peals filed by Northwest Central Pipeline 
Corporation (Northwest Central) in cases 
where judicial review was being sought of 
certain actions by the Kansas Corporation 
Commission (KCQ relative, to infill drilling 
in the Kansas Hugoton Field. Each of the 
four appeals was dismissed on procedural 
grounds by the respective district court and 
Northwest Central appeals therefrom. 
CHRONOLOGY OP EVENTS 
July SI, 1984 - GtiesSerrioe Ofl and Gas Corporation filed 
application with KOC to amend its basic pro-
ration order to permit infill drilling in the 
Kansas Hugoton Held. 
April 24,1986 - KCC order filed i>ennittmg infifl driffing. 
May 5-8,1986 - Various motions for rehearing filed by inter-
ested parties including Northwest Central 
May 16,1986 . KOC grants rehearing, permitting mtrodue-
tion of additions! evidence onfr on some is» 
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May 22,1986 - Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Company files 
motion with KCC seeking clarification of May 
15,1986, order relative to whether, for judi-
cial review purposes, certain portions of the 
April 24,1986, order were final orders. 
May 27,1986 - KCC order filed relative to May 22,1986, 
motion in which KCC states no part of the 
April 24,1986, order is a final order. 
June 16,1986 - Northwest Central files actions in Shawnee 
County and Gray County district courts seek-
ing judicial review of KCC's order of April 
24,1986, permitting infill drilling (appeal 
Nos. 69,785 and 69,788). 
July 18,1986 - KCCs order on rehearing filed at 1:15 pjn. 
which triggered the following filings on the 
same date: 
0) Southwest Kansas Royalty Owners Asso-
ciation files for judicial review in Stevens 
County District Court at 1:16 p.m. 
(2) Northwest Central files for judicial re-
view in Shawnee County District Court at 
222 p.m. (appeal No. 60,187). 
July 81,1986 - Northwest Central files motion with KCC 
seeking rehearing on the July 18,1986, order 
on rehearing. 
August 6,1986 - (1) Rehearing of rehearing order denied by 
KCC. 
(2) Northwest Central files an action in 
Shawnee County District Court seeking judi-
cial review of all KCC orders relative to the 
Cities Service application for infill drilling 
including denial of Northwest Central's "re-
hearing of rehearing" motion. 
The above listing provides the basic se-
quence of events involved in the consolidat-
ed appeals herein. Additional facts will be 
stated as needed for discussion of particu-
lar issues. 
ISSUE I. DID THE RESPECTIVE DIS-
TRICT COURTS ERR IN DISMISSING 
EACH OF THE POUR ACTIONS HERE-
IN ON PROCEDURAL GROUNDS? 
APPEAL NOS. 59,735 and 59,738 
These two petitions for judicial review 
were filed the same day (June 16, 1986) in 
the Shawnee and Gray county district 
courts (86-C-849 and 86-C-24 respectively) 
and are essentially identical. In each case 
the action was dismissed on the ground it 
was premature. More particularly, the 
courts held that the KCC's April 24, 1986, 
order was not a final order by virtue of the 
granting of the rehearing on May 15,1986, 
as clarified by the May 27, 1986, KCC 
order. As the application was still pending 
before the KCC, no final agency action had 
been taken. Northwest Central contends, 
alternatively, that 
1. The April 24,1986, order was final as 
to all matters upon which the KCC did not 
permit the introduction of additional evi-
dence upon rehearing. 
2. The failure of the KCC to permit 
additional evidence on all aspects of the 
original order upon rehearing rendered the 
granting of rehearing a nullity, thereby 
making the April 24, 1986, order a final 
agency action. 
[1] Neither contention has any merit 
The effect of the first contention would be 
to allow piecemeal judicial review of the 
KCC actions on matters before it Assume 
an order covers ten issues. The KCC then 
has second thoughts or reservations con-
cerning its determination on the first issue 
and grants rehearing for the purpose of 
hearing additional evidence and argument 
on that issue. Intervenor A might not like 
the determination of issue two and seeks 
judicial review thereof. Intervenor B 
might not like what the KCC did on issue 
four and seeks judicial review thereof, and 
so on. The result would be piecemeal judi-
cial review actions pending in various 
courts while the KCC is still concerned 
with the rehearing of its order. Obviously, 
the KCC would be limited on the rehearing 
to the first issue and would be unable to 
modify any other part of its original order 
even if a modification of the first issue 
would necessitate modification of other 
parts of the original order. The result 
would be a procedural nightmare that 
would seriously diminish the KCC's ability 
to function. There is no statutory authori-
ty for piecemeal judicial review of the KCC 
order herein. The>parties concede that ju-
dicial review of the KCC's action herein can 
only be had by filing a petition for judicial 
review within 30 days after a final order 
has been entered. The specific statutes 
relative to judicial review will be discussed 
in a later issue. The question before us in 
this issue is when the agency action, or 
parts thereof, became final. 
[2] The alternative contention that the 
failure of the KCC to throw the door open 
to additional evidence on all issues ren-
dered the granting of the rehearing a nulli-
ty is equally untenable. The issues raised 
by the application were complex and the 
hearing thereon lasted some 56 days, in-
N.W. CENTRAL PIPELINE v. STATE CORP. COM'N Kan. 2 4 5 
Cite a* 735 VJA 241 (Kan. 1987) 
volving over 100 witnesses and 12,000 
pages of transcript The May 15, 1986, 
order stated the KCC had enough evidence 
in all but limited areas and limited new 
evidence to those areas. There is nothing 
weird about such a limitation. To hold 
otherwise could have greatly delayed final 
determination of the application for no use-
ful reason. Appellate courts frequently 
limit submission on rehearing which focus-
es attention on the area of concern. This 
does not result in the balance of the appel-
late opinion becoming final or the granting 
of the rehearing a nullity. 
The order of May 15, 1986, granting re-
hearing caused the April 24, 1986, order in 
its totality not to be a final agency action. 
The May 27, 1986, order clarifying the or-
der granting rehearing merely spelled out 
that which was inherent in the May 15, 
1986, order—namely, that no part of the 
April 24, 1986, order was a final agency 
action. Hence, no judicial review of any 
portion of the April 24, 1986, order (or the 
order of May 15,1986, granting rehearing) 
was permissible until the order on rehear-
ing was filed (July 18, 1986). The district 
courts involved in these two appeals were 
clearly correct in dismissing these two ac-
tions for judicial review filed on June 16, 
1986, as being premature on the grounds 
no final order of agency action had been 
taken. 
APPEAL NO. 60,187 
[31 On July 18, 1986, at 1:15 p.m. the 
KCC entered its order upon rehearing. At 
1:16 p.m. the same day, Southwest Kansas 
Royalty Owners Association filed an action 
in Stevens County District Court (86-C-30) 
seeking judicial review thereof. The Ste-
vens County case is not before us. At 2:22 
p.m. of the same day, Northwest Central 
filed its action for judicial review in Shaw-
nee County District Court (86-C-1010). 
This case was dismissed on the ground the 
Stevens County District Court had first 
acquired jurisdiction. This determination is 
in accord with K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 55-606(a) 
which provides that an "action for review 
shall be brought in the district court having 
venue and first acquiring jurisdiction of 
the matter" Clearly, the Stevens County 
District Court action was filed prior to the 
Shawnee County action and thus Stevens 
County first acquired jurisdiction as be-
tween these two petitions. Northwest Cen-
tral does not argue that its July 18, 1986, 
appeal (86-01010) is prior to the Stevens 
County case. Rather, it contends one or 
more of its other three petitions for judicial 
review was or were proper and that July 
18,1986, was not a legally permissible time 
for seeking judicial review. Under no theo-
ry of Northwest Central would its July 16, 
1986, petition for judicial review be valid, 
but it has appealed from its dismissal (60,-
18*0 apparently as a matter of routine pro-
cedure. 
We find no error in the district court's 
dismissal of Northwest Central's July 18, 
1986, petition for judicial review. 
APPEAL NO. 60,143 
[4] The KCC entered its order on re-
hearing on July 18,1986. On July 31,1986, 
Northwest Central filed a motion seeking 
rehearing on the rehearing order. This 
motion was denied by the KCC on August 
6, 1986. Northwest Central filed for judi-
cial review in Shawnee County on the same 
day (86-01084). The district court dis-
missed the petition on the ground that jur-
isdiction lay in Stevens County in case No. 
86-050 filed July 18, 1986. Northwest 
Central appeals from said dismissal in ap-
peal No. 60,143. 
Northwest Central contends that, inas-
much as the KCC's July 18, 1986, order on 
rehearing substantially modified its April 
24,1986, order that it had the duty to seek 
modification thereof via a motion for re-
hearing and that the time for judicial re-
view did not commence until the motion 
was denied on August 6, 1986. 
In support of its position, Northwest 
Central cites K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 66-118b, 
which provides in pertinent part: 
"No cause of action arising out of any 
order or decision of the commission shall 
accrue in any court to any party unless 
such party shall make application for a 
rehearing as herein provided. Such ap-
plication shall set forth specifically the 
ground or grounds on which the appli-
cant considers such order or decision to 
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be unlawful or unreasonable. No party 
shall, in any court, urge or rely upon any 
ground not set forth in the application. 
An order made after a rehearing, abro-
gating, changing or modifying the orig-
inal order or decision, shall have the 
same force and effect as an original 
order or decision, including the obli-
gation to file an application for rehear-
ing, as provided in this section, as a 
condition precedent to filing an action 
for review thereof" (Emphasis sup-
plied.) 
The difficulty with applying this statute 
is that K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 66-118b applies 
to KCC proceedings involving public utili-
ties. The proceedings herein are not 
brought under the act of which K.S A. 1986 
Supp. 66-118b is a part The statutory 
requirement of seeking a rehearing of a 
rehearing order is not contained in the judi-
cial review statutes applicable herein. 
K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 55-606 provides in perti-
nent part 
"(a) Any action of the commission pur-
suant to K.S.A. 55-601 through 55-609, 
and amendments thereto, is subject to 
review in accordance with the act for 
judicial review and civil enforcement of 
agency actions. The action for review 
shall be brought in the district court 
having venue and first acquiring juris-
diction of the matter. Notwithstanding 
the provisions of K.S.A. 77-622 and 
amendments thereto, the authority of the 
court shall be limited to a judgment ei-
ther affirming or setting aside in whole 
or in part the agency action. 
"(b) Before any action for judicial 
review may be brought by a person who 
was a party to the proceeding resulting 
in the agency action, a petition for re-
hearing shall first be filed with the 
commission within 10 days from the 
date of the agency action in question. 
The rehearing shall be granted or denied 
by the commission within 10 days from 
the date the petition is filed and if not 
granted within 10 days it shall be taken 
as denied. If a rehearing is granted the 
matter shall be set for hearing as 
promptly as convenient and shall be de-
termined by the commission within 30 
days after it is submitted. 
"An action for judicial review may be 
brought by any person aggrieved by the 
agency action, whether or not such per-
son was the applicant for rehearing. If 
no petition for rehearing is filed, any 
person aggrieved by the agency action 
who was not a party to the proceeding 
before the commission may bring an ac-
tion for judicial review of such agency 
action. 
"(c) Any action for review pursuant to 
this section shall have precedence in any 
court and on motion shall be advanced 
over any civil cause of different nature 
pending in such court In any such ac-
tion, a county abstract may be filed by 
the commission or any other interested 
party." (Emphasis supplied.) 
K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 55-606 refers to the 
act for judicial review and civil enforce-
ment of agency actions, K.S.A. 77-601 et 
seq. K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 77-€13(b) provides: 
"A petition for judicial review of an 
order is not timely unless filed within 30 
days after service of the order, but the 
time is extended during the pendency of 
the petitioner's timely attempts to ex-
haust administrative remedies/' 
[5] Northwest Central argues that its 
motion for rehearing of the rehearing order 
was a timely attempt to exhaust its admin-
istrative remedies and it had 30 days after 
the denial thereof to seek judicial review. 
Under this logic, Northwest Central con-
tends it can nullify the effect of its loss of 
the July 18, 1986, footrace to the court-
house by simply filing another motion for 
rehearing. This is an unreasonable posi-
tion to assume. The act for judicial review, 
of which K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 77-613(b) is 
part, is a broad act covering all manner of 
agency actions, the vast bulk of which con-
cern one party's dealings with an agency. 
In the matter before us, a large number of 
parties intervened in the proceeding on the 
Cities Service application seeking amend-
ment of its basic proration order to permit 
infill drilling. A major policy of the KCC 
was at issue, the determination of which 
would have far-reaching effects on the pro-
CARTER v. KOCH ENGINEERING Kan. 247 
Cite as 735 P2d 247 (KanApp. 1987) 
duction of natural gas in Kansas. K.S.A. issues reviewed on rehearing before the 
1986 Supp. 55-606 establishes the proce- KCC. 
dure by which rehearing of the order here- . ,. . 
in may be obtained and does not authorize ™ As far as judicial review is con-
a rehearing on a rehearing. The July 18, cerned, such review is statutory. There is 
1986, order on rehearing was a final order n o d u e V™*** n S h t f o r <*cli interested 
and the Stevens County District Court ac- P ^ to » » * iu d i c i a l « * * * fa *" * * * * 
quired jurisdiction of the judicial review court o f e a c h Party ,s choi<»- Judicial re-
thereof on July 18, 1986, pursuant to v i e w w a s obtained in the Stevens County 
K.SJL 1986 Supp. 5(H>06(a). Northwest D i s t r i c t ^ ^ » «** <*"* fi»t acquiring 
Central has sought and received permission jurisdiction under K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 55-
to intervene in the Stevens County action 606<a)- Northwest Central does not con-
and obtain judicial review of all or any tend **** lt w a s U i m t e d m ^Y way &°m 
portion of the first KCC order. f u l 1 participation therein. 
We conclude the Shawnee County Dis- W e conclude this issue is without merit 
trict Court properly dismissed 86-C-1084 The judgments are affirmed, 
on the ground the Stevens County District 
Court had first acquired jurisdiction of the LOCKETT, J., concurs in the result 
matter in issue. 
ISSUE NO. 2. WERE NORTHWEST Vw\ 
CENTRAL'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS VI- & IjU&EESS/ 
OLATED BY THE PROCEDURES HERE- ^ ^ 
IN? 
[6] This issue is an amalgam of com-
plaints concerning what Northwest Central 
perceives to be egregious treatment it has 
received from the KCC. In its lachrymose 
recital of the KCC's actions herein, North-
west Central contends its due process 
rights have been violated. The logic of 
Northwest Central's argument is, however, 
difficult to follow. Northwest Central does 
not contend it was in any manner restricted 
or deprived of the opportunity for full hear-
ing before the KCC prior to the entry of 
the KCC's order of April 24, 1986. The 
shabby treatment complaints all arise in 
connection with the granting of the rehear-
ing and Northwest Central's untimely peti-
tions for judicial review. Northwest Cen-
tral contends, in essence, it had a right to 
have the KCC review all issues on rehear-
ing and that the KCC only reviewed certain 
issues. There is no right to a rehearing— 
the granting or denial of a rehearing is 
discretionary with the KCC. Under its or-
der granting rehearing, the KCC could 
have changed any part of its April 24,1986, 
order although the introduction of addition-
al evidence and subsequent oral argument 
was limited to certain areas. Northwest 
Central has no due process right to have all 
12 KanApp^d 74 
Charles L. CARTER, Appellee, 
v, 
KOCH ENGINEERING, Appellant, 
and 
Aetna Insurance Company, Insurance 
Carrier/Appellant 
No.. 59331. 
Court of Appeals of Kansas. 
April 9, 1987. 
Review Denied May 15,1987. 
Employer and insurer appealed judg-
ment of Sedgwick District Court, Paul W. 
Clark, J., awarding workers' compensation. 
The Court of Appeals, Brazil, J., held that 
(1) finding that worker had lost 80% of use 
of his forearm was supported by substan-
tial evidence; (2) healing period compensa-
tion could be properly awarded; (8) work-
er's violation of rules related to method of 
running punch press did not take his activi-
ties beyond course of his employment; and 
(4) worker's failure to use safety devices 
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Nos. 920206-CA, 910413-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Sept. 7, 1993. 
Fore BILLINGS, JACKSON, and RUSSON. 
AMENDED OPINION CFN13 
.LINGS 
Maverik Country Stores brings separate appeals from two decisions of the 
tstrial Commission of Utah. The first appeal is from the Industrial 
lission's determination that Maverik violated Utah Code Ann. ss 34-35-1 to -
988 & Supp.1993), the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act, in its treatment of 
;y Ann McCord. The second appeal is from the Industrial Commission's ruling 
Maverik1s request for agency review was untimely. We dismiss the first 
al and affirm the ruling in the second. We remand for assessment of 
rney fees. 
FACTS 
Jones, a Maverik store manager, hired Ms. McCord as a convenience store 
k on September 30, 1988. CFN2D McCord worked six hour shifts, four days a 
at $3.35 per hour during her two weeks of part-time employment. While at 
on October 14, 1988, McCord experienced tightness in her chest and asked 
s if she could go to the hospital. The doctor at the hospital indicated 
rd1s heart was fine. McCord subsequently called Jones and offered to 
sh her shift. Jones told her to stay home and rest. While talking to 
rd later that day, Jones stated her mother had died from heart problems and 
son had recently had open heart surgery. She expressed concern over the 
ousness of McCord1s heart problems and indicated she would be afraid to 
e McCord in the store alone. Jones then terminated McCord1s employment, 
ord had answered "no" to an inquiry on the employment application regarding 
her she had any heart problems which would limit her ability to perform the 
She did have a condition known as mitral valve prolapse which the parties 
ulated was a "usually benign condition." A doctor examined McCord after 
was terminated and found employment posed no risk to her. 
es subsequently filled out a company form, a Record of Employee Counseling, 
ribing the event and indicating she was very concerned McCord^ heart 
lem would reoccur if she continued her job with Maverik. In a later letter 
ie Utah Anti-Discrimination Division <UADD), Jones again focused on her 
?rn about a stress related reoccurrence. At the hearing before the 
listrative law judge (ALJ) on the discrimination claim, Jones mentioned 
additional factors for the termination. These were McCord1s difficulty in 
Lng the gas pump meters and allegations that McCord smelled of alcohol at 
These factors, however, were never discussed in the termination 
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?rview nor noted on the termination form. 
lord subsequently sought employment at numerous locations from 1989 to 
L. She worked for a short time as a janitor at an elementary school but was 
red to quit due to an unrelated illness. 
o^rd filed a complaint alleging a violation of the Utah fin,ti-Discrimination 
with the UflDD on October 24, 1988. The UflDD found for McCord in an order 
led January 24, 1991. Maverik requested a formal hearing before an ALJ. The 
*ing was held on May 15, 1991. The flLJ issued findings of fact and 
fusions of law on June 26, 1991. The ALJ1 s June 26, 1991 decision included 
>ecific reservation of the issue of appropriate attorney fees. On September 
1991, the flLJ issued a Supplemental Order disposing of the issue of 
irney fees. 
On July 26, 1991, Maverik filed a Writ of Review with this court (first 
>al). The first appeal is from the flLJ1s Order of June 26, 1991. On August 
1991, McCord and the Industrial commission filed motions to dismiss the 
t appeal based on Maverik1s failure to exhaust administrative remedies and 
of a final order. On September 16, 1991, this court ordered those motions 
rred, and requested the parties include arguments on those issues in their 
fs on the merits. 
pite its pending appeal, Maverik then filed a Request for Review by the 
strial Commission of the flLJ1 s June 26, 1991 and September 10, 1991 
rs. The date the request was filed is unclear. Counsel for Maverik signed 
dated the request October 10, 1991. The request has two received dates 
ped on it, October 11, 1991 and October 15, 1991. In later orders 
rring to the request, the Industrial Commission refers to both dates as the 
it received the request. For the purposes of our review, we assume the 
est was received October 11, 1991. 
February 28, 1992, the Industrial Commission denied Maverik1 s Request for 
ew based on its untimeliness. CFN33 On March 19, 1992, Maverik filed a 
est with the Industrial Commission to reconsider its denial of the Request 
Review. On March 30, 1992, the Industrial Commission denied Maverik1s 
est for Reconsideration. In this denial, the Industrial Commission 
gnized it could have allowed the late Request for Review if Maverik had 
n good cause for extension of the time period. The Industrial Commission 
d, however, that Maverik had failed to show good cause for the extension. 
April 3, 1992, Maverik filed a "Limited Request for Reconsideration" in 
h it finally attempted to show good cause for its late filing of the 
inal Request for Review. The Industrial Commission did not respond to this 
ue motion. On April 7, 1992, Maverik filed a Writ of Review with this 
t (second appeal). The second appeal is from the Industrial commissions 
r Denying Review and Order Denying Request For Reconsideration. 
THE FIRST APPEAL—EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES 
a threshold matter, we must determine whether we have jurisdiction over the 
t appeal. Regardless of who raises the issue, we must dismiss a case if we 
rmine we do not have jurisdiction. Silva v. Department of Employment 
, 786 P.2d 246, 247 (Utah App.1990) (per curiam); see also Thompson v. 
son, 743 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah App.1987) (per curiam). "When a matter is 
ide the court1s jurisdiction it retains only the authority to dismiss the 
an." Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah 
L989). 
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e basic purpose underlying the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative 
edies "is to allow an administrative agency to perform functions within its 
cial competence—to make a factual record, to apply its expertise, and to 
rect its own errors so as to moot judicial controversies." Parisi v. 
idson, 405 U.S. 34, 37, 92 S.Ct. 815, 818 (1972); see also Pacific 
ermountain Express Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 316 P.2d 549, 5511 (Utah 1957) 
cognizing correction rationale). Exceptions to the doctrine exist. For 
mple, in instances where there is a chance that irreparable injury would 
ur if exhaustion was required or where requiring exhaustion would serve no 
ful purpose, the doctrine will not be applied. See Tax Comm'n v. 
rson, 782 P.2d 519, 524 (Utah 1989); see also Utah Code Ann. 63-46b-
2)(a) & (b) (1989). 
In this case, Maverik appealed directly to this court thirty days after 
ALJ1s ruling. The Utah Anti-Discrimination Act provides that following the 
jance of an order after a formal hearing pursuant to the Act "either party 
file a written request for review of the order ... in accordance with 
tion 63-46B-12." Utah Code Ann. s 34-35-7.1(11)(a) (Supp.1993). This 
DWS parties to an anti-discrimination hearing to take advantage of the 
?ral UAPA agency review process. If no timely review is filed "the order by 
presiding officer becomes the final order of the commission." Id. s 34-35-
(11)(b). This section provides that the Industrial Commission need not act 
;he ALJ1s order in any way for that order to take effect. Thus, on the day 
?rik filed its petition for review the ALJ1s order was a final enforceable 
?r of the Industrial Commission. 
) next subsection of the Anti-Discrimination Act, however, requires an 
%ieved party to file for agency review under subsection 11(a) or lose the 
irtunity for judicial review. CFN43 That subsection provides: "An order of 
commission under Subsection (11)(a) is subject to judicial review as 
'ided in Section 63-46b-16." Id. s 34-35-7.1(12) (emphasis added), 
ection 12 could have easily provided that a final order under Subsection 11 
subject to judicial review under UAPA. The clear import of the 
slature's omission of orders final under subsection 11(b) is that they are 
subject to judicial review, subsection 12 simply embodies the general 
ciple that a party must exhaust its administrative remedies prior to 
ining judicial review. Therefore, a party adversely affected by an order 
n ALJ in an anti-discrimination hearing cannot obtain judicial review of 
order until it has been subject to administrative review. Cf. Hi-
try Homeowners Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 779 P.2d 682 (Utah 1989) 
ding Utah Code Ann. 54-7-15(2)(b) required application for rehearing prior 
udicial appeal). 
thermore, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is 
rently embodied in the general provisions of UAPA. One section provides: 
arty may seek judicial review only after exhausting all administrative 
dies available...." Utah Code Ann. s 63-46B-12(2) (1989) (emphasis 
d). This provides additional support for our decision. CFN5] We have no 
sdiction over the first appeal and have no choice but to dismiss it. CFN63 
II. THE SECOND APPEAL 
A. Industrial Commission's Jurisdiction 
erik contends the filing of the first appeal, regardless of its timeliness, 
sted the Industrial Commission of jurisdiction to continue to act in the 
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Thus, according to Miiverik, every action taken by the Industrial 
ission after the ALJ's June 26 Order is a nullity. Maverik would have us 
nd to the Industrial Commission for entry of the Supplemental order on 
rney fees and the agency appeals process. Maverik does not provide any 
vant authority supporting this contention. 
Other courts have consistently recognized an appeal from a non-final 
r does not divest the administrative tribunal of jurisdiction. For 
pie, in Fiebig v. Wheat Ridge Regional Center, 782 P.2d 814 (Colo.App.), 
. denied, (Colo. Oct. 2, 1989), the court held an untimely petition for 
cial review did not divest the agency of jurisdiction to act. Id. at 
In Fiebig, an employee appealed his termination to the State Personnel 
d. The Board referred the complaint to a hearing officer who ruled the 
gations of sexual misconduct against the employee were without merit. The 
ing officer, however, upheld the termination on the grounds the employee 
d no longer perform his job due to the allegations. Both parties appealed 
decision to the Board. The Board ruled the hearing officer's findings were 
fficient and remanded the case to the officer for a new hearing. The 
oyer appealed the Board's ruling to the court of appeals. Subsequently, 
hearing the Board ordered was held and the hearing officer ruled in favor 
he employee. The employer filed a motion with the Board to declare the 
ing officer's order invalid on the grounds the appeal to the court 
inated the agency's jurisdiction. The Board denied the motion. The court 
ppeals upheld the Board's ruling because "an appeal to a court without 
sdiction does not divest the agency of jurisdiction to proceed with the 
on on the merits." Id. at 8i6. Accord Northwest Central Pipeline 
. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 735 P.2d 241 (Kan.1987). 
ilarly, we have recognized a notice of appeal filed while a trial court is 
idering a proper post-judgment motion does not confer jurisdiction on this 
t. DeBry v. Fidelity Nat. Title Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 520, 523 (Utah 
1992), cert, denied, (Utah May 14, 1993). We reasoned "to permit an appeal 
i be an affront to judicial economy" because allowing the trial court to 
Dse of the motion might eliminate needless appeals and discourage pointless 
/. Id. See also Williams v. City of Ualdez, 603 P.2d 483, 488 (Alaska 
I (holding appeal brought from non-final order of a trial court does not 
it court of jurisdiction); Knox v. Dick, 665 P.2d 267, 269 
,1983) (holding "appeal from a non-appealable order does not divest the 
L court of jurisdiction"). Likewise here, allowing an untimely appeal to 
»t the agency of jurisdiction creates the possibility of multiple appeals 
needless delays. 
?r the rule for which Maverik argues, a party who prematurely appeals an 
:y decision could unjustly delay further agency action. The rationale 
id allowing continuing jurisdiction in the agency following an appeal from 
i-final order applies with equal force to allow continuing jurisdiction 
} the action is subject to further administrative review. We thus follow 
lister jurisdictions and conclude appeals from agency orders subject to 
ter administrative review do not divest the agency of jurisdiction. 
>fore, the Industrial commission had jurisdiction to act after the first 
il was filed. 
B. Timeliness 
tcCord and the Industrial Commission argue we should dismiss the second 
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?al because Maverik1s Request for Review of the Final Order of the ALJ was 
mely. Maverik responds its request was timely because either (1) Utah Rule 
}ivil Procedure 6(e) gives it three extra days to file the appeal, (2) the 
ng date is the date of nailing or, (3) the Industrial Conmission abused its 
rretion in failing to extend the filing deadline by one day. The Final 
»r was issued September 10, 1991 and Maverik filed its Request for Review 
iber 11, 1991. Whether URCP 6(e) is applicable or whether the crucial date 
he nailing date are questions that involve the agency's application or 
rpretation of general law which we review under section 63-46b-16(4)(d) for 
ection of error. Morton Int'l. Inc. v. Auditing Div., 814 P.2d 581, 
•89 (Utah 1991); King v. Industrial Conn'n, 850 P.2d 1281, 1285-86 (Utah 
1993). See also SEMECO v. Auditing Div., 849 P.2d 1167, 1172 (Utah 
I) (Durhan, J., dissenting). 
Date of Filing 
A provides a request for review must be filed "within 30 days after the 
ance of the order " Utah Code Ann. s 63.-46B-12U) (A) (1989). The 
est must also "be sent by nail to the presiding officer and to each 
y." Id. s 63-46B-12(l)(B)(IV). The parties agree the order was dated and 
ed September 10, 1991. See Dusty's Inc. v. Auditing Div., 842 P.2d 868, 
(Utah 1992) (holding administrative order is issued on date on face of 
r). 
erik first argues that Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 6(e) gives it a three 
extension on the thirty day filing deadline. That rule provides: 
never a party ... is required to do some act ... within a prescribed period 
r the service of a notice ... upon him and the notice ... is served by 
, 3 days shall be added to the prescribed period." Utah R.Civ.P. 
(emphasis added). That rule must be read in light of section 63-46B-
)(A) of UAPA which requires a party to appeal thirty days after the 
ance of the administrative ruling. Thus, Rule 6(e) does not apply because 
r section 63-46B-12U) (A) of UAPA the time for appeal runs from the 
ance of an order not from the service of an order on a party. 
Filing Requirement 
erik next argues Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 5 CFN73 somehow supports its 
ention the date of mailing is the relevant date. Rule 5(d) explicitly 
gnizes a distinction between the filing of documents and the service of 
nents on a party. See Utah R.Civ.P. 5(d). CFN81 All the language of Rule 
lied on by Maverik relates to service on a party not to the filing of 
ments necessary to start an appeal and is, thus, inapposite. Likewise, 
rik's attempted reliance on the language of section 63-46B-12(l)(B)(IV) is 
rsuasive. The requirement that requests for review be sent to the 
iding officer and the opposing party is a requirement of service, not of 
rig. 
rurther, it is clear that under the procedural rules which govern our 
ts, filing requires actual delivery to the court. For example, in Silva 
apartment of Employment Sec, 786 P.2d 246 (Utah App.1990) (per curiam), we 
Lssed, for lack of jurisdiction, a claim of a petitioner whose petition for 
?w to this court arrived one day late in the mail. The petition had been 
?d two days prior to the day the petition was due. We noted: "The 
nent that an appeal is filed when mailed has been consistently rejected in 
3ast and we reject it here." Id. at 247 (citing Isaacson v. Dorius, 
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P.2d 849 (Utah 1983); State v. Palmer, 777 P.2d 521 (Utah App.1989)). 
Isaacson, the supreme court noted that interpreting filing as mailing 
Id lead to chaos in appellate procedure. Isaacson, 669 P.2d at 851. 
/erik provides no reason why we should interpret the term filing as used in 
3 inconsistently with how we interpret it under the procedural rules used in 
*ts. Thus, absent a showing of good cause for an extension, the term filing 
ised in section 63-46B-12 requires, as a prerequisite to the agency taking 
isdiction over a review, actual delivery of the necessary documents to the 
\cy within the thirty day time limit. 
Extension of Filing Deadline 
ferik next argues the Industrial Commission abused its discretion by failing 
jrant a one day extension of the filing deadline. Maverik does not identify 
portion of 63-46b-16(4) under which it asks us to review this claim. 
King v. Industrial Comm'n, 858 P. 2d 1281, 1286 n. 6 (Utah 
1993) (encouraging counsel to clearly identify the portion of 63-46b-16(4) 
>r which review is sought). Because the authority to grant an extension in 
ling deadline is not in an agency-specific statute, but rather a general 
'ision of UAPA, and because Maverik is arguing an abuse of discretion 
idard, it appears Maverik is necessarily seeking review under Utah Code 
s 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv) (1988). That catch-all portion of section 63-46b-
) provides we can grant relief if the agency action is "arbitrary or 
icious." Id. We review agency action under this section for 
onableness. Anderson v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 839 P.2d 822, 824 (Utah 
). See also SEMECO v. Auditing Div., 849 P.2d 1167, 1174 (Utah 1993) 
ham, J., dissenting). 
The Original Request for Reconsideration 
an agency to extend any deadline established under UAPA the petitioner 
show good cause. See Utah Code Ann. s 63-46b-l(9) (1988). In its Request 
Reconsideration, Maverik made no attempt to show good cause. The 
strial Commission, in its order denying the Request for Reconsideration, 
ifically notes Maverik1 s failure to show good cause. Thus, the Industrial 
ission's decision denying Maverik a one day extension is not unreasonable 
ight of Maverik's complete failure to articulate any facts on which to base 
od cause determination. 
The Second Request for Reconsideration 
In a document captioned "Limited Request for Reconsideration" filed 
1 3, 1992, six days after the original Request for Reconsideration was 
ed and four days before the second appeal was filed, Maverik finally 
mpts to show good cause. There is no authorization for a "Limited Request 
Reconsideration" in UAPA. Counsel's failure to comply with the rules which 
forth the requirements for getting an extension of the filing deadline does 
give him the right to create another layer of administrative appeal. CFN93 
ection of UAPA provides a petitioner with the right to file more than one 
est for reconsideration. CFN103 Endorsing such a procedure would allow 
•lievous counsel to use the right to reconsideration as a tool for needless, 
in some cases, harmful delay. Thus, this filing was appropriately 
Bgarded by the Industrial Commission. CFN113 
ATTORNEY FEES 
ause we reject both appeals, we necessarily affirm the award of costs and 
*ney fees and the award of damages authorized by the ALJ. The ALJ awarded 
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I costs of $1536.26 to McCord. She awarded $19,731 in legal fees to 
*d. She also awarded $11,632.80 in back pay to McCord. CFN123 These 
Js are authorized by Utah Code Ann. s 34-35-7.1(9) (1988). We also award 
%d attorney fees on appeal under the same statute. Thus, we remand the 
to the Industrial Commission for the sole purpose of assessing the 
jpriate amount of attorney fees for this appeal* 
CONCLUSION 
»rik brought the first appeal prior to exhausting the available 
ustrative remedies. Maverik brought the second appeal from a reasonable 
\q of the Industrial Commission that Maverik1s Request for Review was 
sely. Thus, we dismiss case 
sber 910413-CA and affirm the Order of the Industrial Commission in case 
?r 920206-CA. We remand the case to the Indu-trial Commission for the sole 
purpose of assessing attorney fees on appeal. 
15, 1988 to March 31, 1990 
35 per hr for 24 hrs a week 
J. 40 per week for 76 weeks 
I 1, 1990 to March 31, 1991 
ffi RPF hP fflP £4 hrs a week 
L.20 per week for 52 weeks 
I 1, 1991 to June 26, 1991 
25 per hr for 24 hrs a week 
52.00 per week for 12.5 weeks 
3tal 
» earnings at Ashley Elementary 
Pay award equals 
<SON And RUSSON, JJ., concur. 
FNl. This opinion replaces the earlier opinion in cases No. 920206-CA and 
vlo. 910413-CA, issued June 3, 1993, pursuant to cross-petitions for 
shearing granted August 28, 1993. 
FN2. Because Appellant does not challenge the factual findings of the 
Industrial Commission, we recite the facts in accord with those findings. 
3ee King v. Industrial Comm'n, 850 P. 2d 1281, 1285 (Utah App. 1 993). 
FN3. In the Order denying the Request for Review, the Industrial 
Commission also addressed and rejected Maverik1 s claims on the merits. 
Because of our ultimate conclusion, we need not and do not comment on the 
propriety of the Industrial Commission's disposition on the merits. 
FN4. We note our concern that despite the inordinate amount of briefing 
and conflict in this case, no party to either of these appeals directed us 
to the determinative statute. 
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FN5. Because we find the Anti-Discrimination Act required Maverik to 
petition for review by the Industrial Commission, we do not directly 
address, but merely acknowledge, some conflict between our decision and 
Heinecke v. Department of Commerce, 810 P.2d 459 (Utah App.1991). 
Although the Industrial Commission asks us to revisit that decision, we 
find it unnecessary at this time. In Heinecke, we focused on the 
language of Utah Code Ann. s 63-46B-12(l)(A) (1989) and held a petitioner 
need not avail himself of a review permitted by agency rule prior to filing 
an appeal to this court. We distinguished such permissive review from 
review which is statutorily mandated. Id. at 462. See also Hi-
Country Homeowners Assoc, v. Public Service Comm'n, 779 P.2d 682, 684 (Utah 
1989) (holding review pursuant Utah Code Ann. s 54-7-15(2)(b) must be 
exhausted prior to judicial appeal). 
In Heinecke, however, we did not address the impact of Utah Code Ann. s 
63-46b-14(2) (1989) which provides: "A party may seek judicial review only 
after exhausting all administrative remedies available...." Id. See 
also Tax Comm'n v. Iverson, 782 P.2d 519, 524 n. 3 (Utah 1989) (citing 
section 63-46b-14 for proposition petitioner must exhaust administrative 
remedies prior to judicial review). According to the Industrial Commission 
section 63-46b-14(2) requires a party to utilize every possible agency 
review prior to filing an administrative appeal. We note Heinecke was 
rendered without the benefit of briefing by counsel. Heinecke, 810 P.2d 
at 462. Further, we specifically recognized we might revisit Heinecke 
at an appropriate point in the future. Id. at 464 n.6. That day still 
awaits. 
FN6. Regardless of the premature nature of its appeal, Maverik asks us to 
apply Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(c) and find the appeal 
procedurally proper. Maverik fails to note, however, that Rule 4(c) does 
not apply to petitions for review of administrative actions. See Utah 
R. App. P. 18. 
FN7. Rule 5 relates to the service and filing of papers. See Utah 
R.Civ.P. 5. 
FN8. That section provides: 
311 papers after the complaint required to be served upon a party shall be 
filed with the court either before service or within a reasonable time 
thereafter, but the court may upon motion of a party or on its own 
initiative order that depositions, interrogatories, requests for documents, 
requests for admissions and answers and responses thereto not be filed 
jnless on order of the court or for use in the proceeding. 
Jtah R. Civ. P. 5(d) (emphasis added). 
FN9. As our supreme court has noted in a different setting, if we allow a 
second motion for reconsideration or "re-reconsideration" what is to 
srevent another motion for re-re-reconsideration? " 'Tenacious litigants 
and lawyers might persist in motions, arguments and pressures and 
theoretically Cthis could go on] ad infinitum.1 " Watkiss 4 Campbell v. 
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FOA 4 Sons, 808 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Utah 1991) (quoting Drury v. Lanceford, 
415 P.2d 662, 663 (1966)) (alteration added). 
FN10. Likewise, under the administrative law scheme in place prior to UAPA 
we noted that a petitioner could not file successive motions for review. 
See Ring v. Industrial Comm'n, 744 P. 2d 602, 603 (Utah App.1987) (per 
curiam). Under that scheme filing material which purports to supplement an 
already denied motion did not revive the motion. Id. As we explicitly 
noted in Ring, a petitioner is only "entitled to 'one bite of the apple1 
on review before the Industrial Commission." Id. at 604. Under UAPA, 
the same reasoning applies to requests for reconsideration, a petitioner 
has only one opportunity to apply for reconsideration. See also Utility 
Trailer Sales of Salt L~ke, Inc. v. Fake, 740 P.2d 1327, 1329 (Utah 1987) 
(recognizing rule against repetitive adjudications in arbitration 
setting); Tuom v. Duane Hall Trucking, 675 P.2d 1200, 1202 (Utah 1984) 
(recognizing rule against repetitive challenges to Industrial Commission 
determinations of spousal dependency); Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 969 (Utah App.1989) (recognizing rule against 
successive post-judgment motions). 
FN11. Even if we were to treat the second Request for Reconsideration as 
procedurally proper, we would dismiss the second appeal. The request would 
reinvoke the jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission. Under UAPA, 
because the Industrial commission did not respond to the request it would 
be deemed denied April 23, 1992 by operation of law. See Utah Code Ann. 
63-46B-13(3)(B) (1989); Lopez v. Career Serv. Review Bd., 834 P.2d 568, 
572 (Utah App.1992), cert, denied, 843 P. 2d 1042 (Utah 1992). Therefore 
no "final agency action" for this court to review existed until after April 
23, 1992. 
UAPA provides: 
Within 20 days after the date that an order is issued for which review by 
the agency or by a superior agency under Section 63-46B-12 is unavailable, 
and if the order would otherwise constitute final agency action, any party 
may file a written request for reconsideration with the agency.... Utah 
Code Ann. s 63-46B-13(l)(A) (1989) (emphasis added). This section provides 
a petitioner with the option of applying to the agency for reconsideration 
or appealing to the courts. It does not provide a petitioner the 
opportunity to pursue both routes concurrently. The emphasized language 
indicates a petitioner who decides to file a request for reconsideration no 
longer has a "final agency action" from which to appeal. The petitioner 
must wait until the request is either responded to in writing or denied by 
operation of law. Section 63-46B-13(l)(A) provides a request for 
reconsideration is not a mandatory step in exhausting administrative 
remedies or reaching "finality" to give the courts jurisdiction over an 
appeal. Under UAPA, a request for reconsideration asks the highest level 
of administrative decision maker to-reassess a claim they have previously 
examined. A request for review, on the other hand, asks a higher level 
decision-maker to evaluate the claim. Compare Utah Code Ann. 63-46B-12 
(1989) (agency review procedures) with id. s 63-46B-13 (requests for 
reconsideration). Petitioners who choose to take advantage of the 
COPR. (C) WEST 1993 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOVT. WORKS 
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statutory provision that allows them to request reconsideration must 
thereafter accept the consequences, one of which is that an appeal to the 
judicial system cannot be made until the agency acts on the request. 
Thus, the second request for reconsideration would have given the 
Industrial Commission another opportunity to address the merits. 
Therefore, as of April 7, 1992, Maverik would have no final order from 
which to appeal. Under this analysis, the second appeal would be brought 
from a non-final order over which we have no jurisdiction and we would 
dismiss it. 
Further, the window for Maverik to file an appeal from the Industrial 
Commission's denial of the second request would have been from April 23, 
1992 to May 23, 1992. Thus, regardless of the analysis we apply, Maverik 
is left without judicial review of the merits. 
FN12. Counsel for Maverik has consistently complained no actual damages 
amount was set in the ALJ1s order. He apparently is unwilling to do the 
math using the formula established in the ALJ1s original order. To 
eliminate any confusion and reduce future conflict in this unnecessarily 
contentious litigation, we set forth the back pay calculation using the 
formula established in the ALJ1s original order. 
IF DOCUMENT 
CQPR. (C) WEST 1993 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOVT. WORKS 
today and make that a part of the record 
and I will consider the timeliness and 
determine from that whether I can con-
sider the merits. 
The administrative law judge did not mis-
lead Armstrong such that her right to a 
fair hearing was jeopardized. 
[5] Armstrong also argues her due 
process rights were compromised by the 
short duration of the appeals period- We 
disagree. The Utah Supreme Court previ-
ously rejected this argument in addressing 
the short statutory appeals period for those 
appealing judgments from small claims 
courts. Before a 1988 amendment in-
creased the appeals period to ten days, an 
appellant had only five days in which to 
appeal a small claims court judgment 
Nevertheless, the supreme court found this 
time period did not deprive appellants of 
their constitutional rights. See, e.g., Lar-
son Ford Sales, Inc. v. Silver, 551 P.2d 
233, 233 (Utah) (small claims court appel-
lant having five days to appeal is not de-
nied equal protection and is "given a rea-
sonable time within which to take an ap-
peal"), appeal dismissed 429 U.S. 909, 97 
S.Ct 299, 50 L.Ed.2d 277 (1976); accord 
Hume t>. Small Claims Court, 590 P.2d 
309, 311 (Utah 1979); see also Kapetanov 
v. Small Claims Court, 659 P.2d 1049, 
1052 (Utah 1983) (small claims courts' five-
day appeals period does not offend due 
process and fact that other civil appellants 
have a thirty-day appeals period "is of no 
consequence"). 
CONCLUSION 
We conclude the Board did not err in 
declining to address the merits of Arm-
strong's untimely appeal. Armstrong 
failed to demonstrate good cause for filing 
her appeal late, the deadline for filing an 
appeal is not ambiguous, and Armstrong's 
constitutional rights were not jeopardized. 
Therefore, we affirm. 
ORME and RUSSON, JJ., concur. 
George A. LOPEZ, Petitioner, 
v. 
CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
and Industrial Commission of 
Utah, Respondents. 
No. 910501-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
May 27, 1992. 
State employee sought review of juris-
dictional hearing conducted by Career Ser-
vice Review Board wherein Board deter-
mined that it did not have jurisdiction to 
hear his employment grievance. The Court 
of Appeals, Bench, P J., held that (1) pro-
ceeding was a formal adjudicative one that 
it could properly review; (2) letter from 
hearing officer was not "written order" 
and employee's petition for judicial review, 
filed within 30 days of date his request for 
reconsideration of hearing officer's decision 
was deemed denied, was timely; (3) hear-
ing officer's refusal to consider employee's 
written proffer of facts did not violate due 
process; and (4) Board lacked jurisdiction, 
insofar as employee was not subjected to 
"de facto suspension" when he opted to 
take unpaid leave of absence in order to 
attend law school, and employing agency 
did not violate personnel rule by deciding 
not to allow him to job share. 
Affirmed. 
1. Administrative Law and Procedure 
<s=>796 
Questions regarding whether adminis-
trative agency has afforded petitioner due 
process in its hearings are questions of 
law, and court therefore does not give def-
erence to agency's actions. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmends. 5, 14. 
2. Appeal and Error <3=>842(1) 
Jurisdictional determinations are ques-
tions of law to which Court of Appeals 
gives no deference. 
3, Administrative Law and Procedure 
Officers and Public Employees e=»72.41 
Administrative appeal by state employ-
ee seeking review of jurisdictional hearing 
conducted by Career Service Review Board, 
wherein Board determined that it did not 
have jurisdiction to hear employee's griev-
ance, was formal adjudicative proceeding 
that Court of Appeals could properly re-
view; hearing was conducted and there 
was no showing that any of the statutory 
requirements of formal hearing set forth in 
Utah Administrative Procedure Act had not 
been met U.CJL1953, 63-46b-8, 63-46b-
16. 
4. Administrative Law and Procedure 
<^723 
Officers and Public Employees $=>72.47 
Hearing officer's letter sent nine days 
after state employee requested that officer 
reconsider her decision, stating that officer 
had read employee's motion and that it had 
not persuaded her to change her decision, 
was not "written order" within meaning of 
Utah Administrative Procedure Act, inso-
far as it was not sufficiently detailed; thus, 
employee's request for reconsideration was 
deemed denied as matter of law 20 days 
after it was filed, and his petition for judi-
cial review, filed within 30 days of deemed 
denial, was timely. U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-
10(1), 63-46b-13(3)(a, b), 63-46b-14(3)(a). 
Sec publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
5- Administrative Law and Procedure 
<S=>469 
Constitutional Law e=>278.4(5) 
Officers and Public Employees <3=>72«16 
Even if hearing officer improperly re-
fused to consider state employee's written 
proffer of facts, that refusal did not violate 
due process, absent showing that hearing 
officer's actions were patently unfair; em-
ployee was allowed to testify at length in 
lieu of written statement, which did not 
contain a single fact that employee was not 
allowed to present orally* U.S.C.A. Const 
Amends. 5, 14. 
Cite as 854 P.2d 568 (Utah App. 1992) 
6. Officers and Public Employees <s=>72,61 
State employee had burden of showing 
that his grievance fit into statutorily desig-
nated category in order to bring that griev-
ance before Career Service Review Board. 
U.C.A.1953, 67-19a-202(l). 
7. Officers and Public Employees <s=72.22 
For purposes of determining whether 
Career Service Review Board had jurisdic-
tion of its grievance, senior investigator 
with Utah State Industrial Commission was 
not given "de facto suspension" when Com-
mission required him to take unpaid leave 
of absence in order to attend law school; 
employee made conscious decision to attend 
law school after being formally notified 
that he would be required to take a leave of 
absence if he did so. U.C.A.1953, 67-19a-
202(1). 
8. Officers and Public Employees <s=>72.22 
For purposes of determining whether 
Career Service Review Board had jurisdic-
tion to hear state employee's grievance, 
Utah State Industrial Commission's deci-
sion not to allow senior investigator to job 
share did not violate personnel rule, insofar 
as rule gave Commission full discretion as 
to whether job sharing would be allowed. 
U.C.A.1953, 67-19a-202(l). 
Lynn J. Lund, Salt Lake City, for peti-
tioner. 
Benjamin A. Sims and Thomas C. Sturdy, 
Salt Lake City, for respondents. 
Before BENCH, PJ., and ORME and 
RUSSON, JJ. 
BENCH, Presiding Judge: 
Petitioner Lopez seeks review of a juris-
dictional hearing conducted by respondent 
Career Service Review Board (the Board), 
wherein the Board determined that it did 
not have jurisdiction to hear Lopez's em-
ployment grievance. We affirm. 
FACTS 
Lopez is a senior investigator with the 
Utah State Industrial Commission (the 
Commission). He claims that in 1989 he 
saw a clear trend by the Commission to-
wards using investigators with legal train-
ing.1 Since Lopez had no legal training, he 
decided that it would be to his professional 
advantage to attend law school He ap-
plied for and was accepted to the Universi-
ty of Utah law school. Upon learning of 
his acceptance, Lopez requested that he be 
allowed to work part-time while attending 
law school. His immediate supervisor in-
formed him in writing that his proposal to 
work part-time was rejected. Lopez never-
theless pursued additional discussions in an 
attempt to accommodate the interests of 
the Commission. Various alternatives 
were discussed, but none was accepted. 
Lopez claims that at one point in the 
discussions his supervisor asked him to 
draft a contract reflecting his proposal to 
work part-time on a job share basis. Lopez 
assumed that the request indicated that his 
job share proposal had been accepted. The 
contract he prepared, however, was never 
expressly accepted or rejected by the Com-
mission. 
Lopez went to law school. Part of his 
proposed plan was that he would use his 
annual leave while adjusting to law-school 
life. He therefore took approximately one 
month of annual leave at the beginning of 
the school year. When he attempted to 
return to work part-time, however, he was 
informed that his proposal to job share was 
still unacceptable. The Commission of-
fered him the opportunity to work at a 
temporary level for 19 hours a week, but, 
because it was a temporary position, he 
would be required to relinquish his career 
service status. In the alternative, the Com-
mission was willing to grant him a leave of 
absence without pay, thereby keeping his 
status intact The only other alternative 
was for him simply to resign his position. 
Lopez opted to take the leave of absence 
1. The Commission denies any trend, but it does 
admit that in advertisements for investigators it 
had indicated that preference would be given to 
those with legal training. 
2. The Commission asserts that UAPA does not 
govern this case because UAPA does not apply 
to "internal personnel actions within an agency 
concerning its own employees, or judicial re-
view of those actions." Section 63-46b-l(2)(e). 
The Board errs in asserting that the Board's 
and, under protest, signed an agreement to 
that effect. Following his first year of law 
school, Lopez returned to full-time work 
with the Commission in his former position. 
Lopez filed a grievance that progressed 
unsuccessfully through the Commission's 
internal review process. Lopez then re-
quested an evidentiary hearing before the 
Board. Inasmuch as there was some ques-
tion whether the Board was authorized to 
hear the grievance, the administrator of 
the Board ordered that a jurisdictional 
hearing be conducted. The administrator 
then recused himself due to a conflict 
caused by his involvement with an advisory 
board of the Commission, and a hearing 
officer was appointed to conduct the hear-
ing. 
At the hearing, Lopez "proffered" his 
version of the facts in writing. The hear-
ing officer refused to accept his written 
version due to its length and argumenta-
tive nature. The Commission proposed its 
own "chronology" of events and doc-
uments, which was admitted without objec-
tion from Lopez. Lopez was then allowed 
to testify as to any facts he felt were 
relevant His counsel questioned him for 
approximately three hours. The hearing 
officer then ruled that the grievance did 
not come within any of the statutory cate-
gories over which the Board had jurisdic-
tion. The hearing officer further held that 
Lopez was not harmed by the Commission's 
actions because he was allowed to return to 
his former position after the leave of ab-
sence. 
In accordance with section 13 of the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA), 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l to -22 (1989), 
Lopez requested that the hearing officer 
reconsider her decision.2 The decision was 
not altered, and Lopez filed this petition for 
actions constitute "internal personnel actions 
within an agency.** The Board is an agency 
external to the Commission to which personnel 
matters are appealed. UAPA therefore applies. 
This conclusion is supported by statutory lan-
guage within the chapter establishing the Board 
that indicates UAPA applies to actions by the 
Board. See, e.g.t Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-19a-
202(2), 67-19a-203(6) (1986). 
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review. He alleges three principal errors 
by the hearing officer: (1) the refusal to 
accept his written proffer of facts was a 
denial of due process, (2) the conclusion 
that the Board did not have jurisdiction to 
hear his grievance was erroneous, and (3) 
the finding that he was not harmed by the 
Commission's actions was clearly errone-
ous. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1,2] Questions regarding whether an 
administrative agency has afforded a peti-
tioner due process in its hearings are ques-
tions of law. We therefore do not give 
deference to the agency's actions. Tolman 
v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 
23, 28 (Utah App.1991). Jurisdictional de-
terminations are questions of law to which 
we give no deference. Department of So-
cial Servs. v. Vijil, 784 P.2d 1130, 1132 
(Utah 1989). 
OUR JURISDICTION 
Before addressing the merits of the peti-
tion, we consider two threshold questions 
as to whether this court has jurisdiction. 
Formal or Informal Proceedings 
[3] The first jurisdictional question in-
volves whether this administrative appeal 
should be before the district court. UAPA 
provides that district courts have exclusive 
jurisdiction over administrative appeals 
from informal adjudicative proceedings. 
Section 63-46b-15. Administrative appeals 
from formal adjudicative proceedings are 
to be made either to this court or to the 
supreme court. Section 63-46b-16. 
Administrative appeals that are improp-
erly brought to this court are to be trans-
ferred to the district court pursuant to 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 44. 
Alumbaugh v. White, 800 P.2d 825 (Utah 
App.1990). In Alumbaugh, the administra-
tor of the Career Services Review Board 
conducted an administrative review of an 
employee's grievance file without a hear-
ing. We held that the absence of a hearing 
made the Board's action informal, despite 
the Board's designation of all adjudicative 
proceedings as formal, and transferred the 
case to district court for a trial de novo. 
Id. 
In the present case, the hearing officer 
conducted a hearing. Lopez was allowed 
to appear before the hearing officer and to 
present his position. Evidence and doc-
uments were accepted into the record, and 
a court reporter was present There has 
been no showing that any of the require-
ments of a formal hearing, as set forth in 
section 8 of UAPA, have not been met 
Since there was a hearing, and there is no 
showing of any violations of section 8, we 
conclude that this was a formal adjudica-
tive proceeding that we may properly re-
view. 
Timeliness 
[4] The second jurisdictional question 
involves the timeliness of Lopez's petition 
to this court. The hearing officer entered 
her decision on July 2, 1991. Lopez re-
quested on July 22nd that the hearing offi-
cer reconsider her decision. On July 31st, 
the hearing officer sent Lopez a letter. 
The full text of the letter was as follows: 
"I have read your Motion for Reconsidera-
tion and Evidentiary Hearing. This let-
ter is to notify you that your motion has 
not persuaded me to change my decision." 
Lopez filed this petition for review on Sep-
tember 3rd. 
Subsection 14(3)(a) of UAPA provides: 
"A party shall file a petition for judicial 
review of final agency action within 30 
days after the date that the order constitut-
ing the final agency action is issued or is 
considered to be issued under Subsection 
63-46b-13(3Xb)." Subsection 13(3} applies 
to requests that an agency reconsider its 
action and provides: 
(a) The agency head, or a person desig-
nated for that purpose, shall issue a writ-
ten order granting the request or deny-
ing the request 
(b) If the agency head or the person 
designated for that purpose does not is-
sue an order within 20 days after the 
filing of the request, the request for 
reconsideration shall be considered to be 
denied. 
The issue is whether the letter from the 
hearing officer constitutes a "written or-
der." If it does, then Lopez's appeal is 
untimely, the thirty days having run their 
course on August 30th, four days before 
Lopez filed his petition. If the letter did 
not constitute a written order, then Lopez's 
request for reconsideration was deemed de-
nied, as a matter of law, on August 11th, 
twenty days from his request Lopez's 
filing on September 3rd would therefore be 
timely. 
Section 10 of UAPA requires considera-
ble detail in agency orders issued in connec-
tion with formal adjudicative proceedings. 
It states, in pertinent part 
(1) Within a reasonable time after the 
hearing, or after the filing of any post-
hearing papers permitted by the presid-
ing officer, or within the time required 
by any applicable statute or rule of the 
agency, the presiding officer shall sign 
and issue an order that includes: 
(a) a statement of the presiding offi-
cer's findings of fact . . . ; 
(b) a statement of the presiding offi-
cer's conclusions of law; 
(c) a statement of the reasons for 
the presiding officer's decision; 
(d) a statement of any relief ordered 
by the agency; 
(e) a notice of the right to apply for 
reconsideration; 
(f) a notice of any right to adminis-
trative or judicial review of the order 
available to aggrieved parties; and 
(g) the time limits applicable to any 
reconsideration or review. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-10 (1989). 
An ambiguous letter, merely indicating 
that the request for reconsideration was 
unpersuasive, does not constitute a "writ-
ten order" as described in subsection 10(1). 
As a matter of appellate necessity, we 
must have unambiguous final administra-
tive orders from which we may calculate 
jurisdictional time periods. Otherwise, our 
jurisdiction can become uncertain. 
Inasmuch as the hearing officer's letter 
was insufficient to constitute a written or-
der as anticipated by subsection 13(3)(a), 
Lopez's request for reconsideration is 
deemed denied on August 11th under sub-
section 13(3)(b). His petition for review is 
therefore timely. 
THE MERITS 
Proffer of Facts 
[5] Lopez first asserts that the hearing 
officer denied him due process by not con-
sidering his written proffer of facts. He 
relies upon Tolman for the proposition that 
"due process demands a new trial when the 
appearance of unfairness is so plain that 
[the appellate court is] left with the abiding 
impression that a reasonable person would 
find the hearing unfair." Tolman, 818 
P.2d at 28 (quoting Bunnell v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 740 P.2d 1331, 1333 n. 1 (Utah 
1987)). Even if it were, improper for the 
hearing officer to refuse to consider Lo-
pez's written version of the facts, as assert-
ed by Lopez, he has nevertheless failed to 
present to this court any explanation of 
how the actions of the hearing officer were 
patently unfair. At the hearing, Lopez 
was allowed to testify at length in lieu of 
the written statement He has not directed 
us to a single fact contained in the written 
statement that he was not allowed to 
present orally to the hearing officer. Giv-
en Lopez's opportunity to testify, we sim-
ply are not left with an abiding impression 
that a reasonable person would find the 
hearing unfair. 
Jurisdiction of Board 
The Board was established to provide 
state civil service employees with a forum 
for appealing personnel decisions outside 
the agency for which they work. The 
Board, however, does not have jurisdiction 
to hear all appeals of all personnel matters. 
Its jurisdiction is statutorily limited to cer-
tain agency actions. 
(a) The board shall serve as the final 
administrative body to review appeals 
from career service employees and agen-
cies of decisions about promotions, dis-
missals, demotions, suspensions, written 
reprimands, wages, salary, violations of 
personnel rules, issues concerning the eq-
uitable administration of benefits, reduc-
tions in force, and disputes concerning 
abandonment of position that have not 
been resolved at an earlier stage in the 
grievance procedure. 
(b) The board has no jurisdiction to 
review or decide any other personnel 
matters. 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-202(l) (Supp. 
1991) (emphasis added).3 
When an employee files a grievance with 
the Board, subsection 403(2)(a) requires the 
Board's administrator to determine the fol-
lowing factors before the Board may hear 
the grievance. 
(i) whether or not the employee is a 
career service employee and is entitled to 
use the grievance system, 
(ii) whether or not the board has juris-
diction over the grievance, 
(iii) whether or not the employee has 
been directly harmed; and 
(iv) the issues to be heard. 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-403(2)(a) (Supp. 
1991). 
In order to make the determinations re-
quired, the administrator may "hold a juris-
dictional hearing, where the parties may 
present oral arguments, written argu-
ments, or both/1 Subsection 67-19a-
403(2)(b)(i). This was the basis and goal of 
the jurisdictional hearing from which Lopez 
now appeals.4 
[6] Lopez initially challenges the hear-
ing officer's determination that the Board 
lacked jurisdiction by asserting that the 
Board's administrator erroneously placed 
the "burden of proof" on Lopez to prove 
that the Board had jurisdiction. It is axio-
matic that a party wishing to bring a mat-
ter before a tribunal with limited subject 
matter jurisdiction must present sufficient 
facts to invoke the limited jurisdiction of 
that tribunal. Department of Social 
3. All other matters may be grieved only to the 
level of the department head whose decision is 
final and unappealable to the Board. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 67-19a-302(2) (Supp.1991). 
4, Lopez asserts that the hearing officer improp-
erly treated the jurisdictional hearing as a hear-
ing on the merits. There is some language in 
the hearing officer's decision that supports his 
claim. As indicated in subsection 403(2)(b), the 
jurisdictional hearing is to consider the four 
Servs. v. Vijil, 784 R2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 
1989). It was therefore necessary for Lo-
pez to show that his grievance fit into one 
of the categories of grievances designated 
in subsection 202(1) in order to bring his 
grievance before the Board. 
[7] Lopez argues the Board has juris-
diction because the Commission's require-
ment that he take a leave of absence with-
out pay was a "de facto suspension/1 The 
hearing officer, however, found that Lopez 
made a conscious decision to attend law 
school and that his decision was made after 
he had been formally notified that he would 
be required to take a leave of absence if he 
were to attend law school. The hearing 
officer also found that the ongoing discus-
sions between Lopez and the Commission 
concerning other possible work alternatives 
had not resulted in a meeting of the minds. 
Given the hearing officer's factual find-
ings, it is clear that the unpaid leave of 
absence was the direct result of Lopez's 
unilateral and voluntary decision to attend 
law school. It was not in any way initiated 
by the Commission. The record is clear 
that Lopez was always free to remain in 
his job full time as long as he did not elect 
to attend law school. He may not now 
transform the direct result of his own vol-
untary decision into a "de facto suspen-
sion" by the Commission. 
[8] Lopez also argues that the Commis-
sion violated several personnel rules when 
it refused to allow him to work during law 
school. As stated in subsection 202(1), 
grievances arising from violations of per-
sonnel rules are within the Board's jurisdic-
tion. Lopez points to Human Resource 
Management Rule R468-5-12, which states 
with our emphasis: 
factors set out in subsection 403(2)(a). If an 
employee's grievance meets the statutory re-
quirements in subsection 403(2)(a), the employ-
ee is entitled to a hearing on the merits of the 
claim. Any language suggesting that the hear-
ing officer considered the actual merits of Lo-
pez's grievance was nevertheless harmless since 
the factual findings clearly show that jurisdic-
tion was lacking as a matter of law. 
program of job sharing as a means of 
increasing opportunities for career part-
time employment. In the absence of an 
agency program, individual employees 
may request approval for job sharing 
status through agency management. 
Utah Admin.Code § R468-5-12 (1991). 
The hearing officer held that the Com-
mission's decision not to allow Lopez to job 
share was not a violation of this policy 
because the rule gives the Commission full 
discretion whether to allow job sharing. 
The hearing officer reasoned that since 
there was no mandate that job sharing be 
allowed, job sharing was a privilege that 
might be granted by the Commission, but it 
was not a right to which Lopez was entitled 
by law. Since the Commission's decision 
not to allow job sharing was within its 
discretion, Lopez's complaint could not logi-
cally constitute a claim that a personnel 
rule had been "violated." We agree. 
Discretionary personnel powers granted 
to agencies do not constitute mandates. 
Absent a statutory mandate that an em-
ployee receive a certain benefit, the em-
ployee may not demand it as a right Since 
there was no mandate requiring the Com-
mission to allow Lopez to job share, Lopez 
has failed to identify any personnel rule 
that was violated by the Commission's re-
fusal to allow him to job share. Jurisdic-
tion therefore was properly denied.5 
Harm to Lopez 
Finally, Lopez claims that the hearing 
officer erred when she found that he had 
not been harmed by being "required" to 
take an unpaid leave of absence because he 
was able to return to his former position. 
Whether Lopez was directly harmed by the 
Commission's action is the third factor to 
be determined at a jurisdictional hearing. 
See section 67-19a-403(2)(aXiii). However, 
the hearing officer did not need to reach 
this issue because she determined that Lo-
pez's grievance did not fall within the cate-
5. Lopez also points to the Human Resource 
Management Rules regarding Time Limited Po-
sitions," Utah Admin.Code § R468-5-10 (1991), 
and "Education Assistance," Utah Admin.Code 
§ R468-HM (1991). We limit our discussion to 
had jurisdiction. Regardless of whether or 
not Lopez was harmed, the Board could not 
hear the grievance. We therefore need not 
address this final claim of error. 
CONCLUSION 
The hearing officer's finding that the 
Board lacked jurisdiction to hear Lopez's 
grievance is affirmed. 
ORME and RUSSON, JJ.f concur. 
Jasbir S. BHATIA, Petitioner, 
v. 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
SECURITY; and Pizza Hut of 
Utah, Respondents. 
No. 910498-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
June 2, 1992. 
Cook sought judicial review of final 
decision of Board of Review of Industrial 
Commission denying his application for un-
employment compensation benefits. The 
Court of Appeals, Billings, Associate PJ., 
held that cook who stormed out of restau-
rant during middle of busy shift after ut-
tering vulgarity to manager was dis-
charged for "just cause" and not entitled to 
unemployment compensation benefits. 
Affirmed. 
Bench, PJ., concurred and filed opin-
ion. 
the policy on job sharing since our analysis 
applies equally to all three policies. Under 
these rules, agencies are given the ability to 
create time limited positions and provide edu-
cation assistance in their discretion. 
